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MEANING IN THE LIFE OF THE LAvVYER
JAMES BOYD WHITE*
First let me say what a pleasure it is to be here on such an
occasion. 1 Dean Kronman is an old and valued friend, and I
am very glad to be able to visit your school, of which I have
heard many good things. In the remarks that follow I shall
respond to Dean Kronman's eloquent and elegiac account of
"civility" in our culture, and in the law, not so much by
marking agreement or disagreement as by offering a few
loosely connected reflections on the topics he raises.
I.
The first of these has to do with the appeal of a life of
civic responsibility and action, or "civility." This seems to me
to lie not only in the necessarily vain, but deeply human, hope
of immortality, as Dean Kronman suggested, but to have a
more immediate ground or basis as well: in one's need to
belong to a larger community and to have a place within it, as
a participant and not merely an observer. This need is in turn
based partly on another, equally interesting and important: the
need to claim meaning for our shared experience. Thus we
see an elected politician, or candidate running for office,
saying over and over again, "This is how we are situated; this
is how we got here; this is what we need." In doing this he tells
a story of the polity, giving it both a character and a role in a
narrative, and he gives the story itself a meaning: "America:
the land of equality," or "opportunity"; "Birmingham: the city
of steel," or "tradition"; "the University: center of research," or
"teaching." The activities of public life in this way attempt to
meet our need to claim meaning for our existence, both as
individuals and as a larger community; and they do this not
only when we agree with the meanings claimed and find them
comfortable, but also at the worst and most awful moments in
our shared life: when a tyrant comes to power, for example, or
someone starts a civil war. The need to claim meaning for
'AB., Amherst, 1960; AM., Harvard, 1961; LLB., Harvard, 1964. Hart Wright
Professor of Law, Professor of English, and Adjunct Professor of Classical Studies, The
University of Michigan.
1 These remarks were originally prepared for presentation at the Ray Rushton
Distinguished Lecturer Series, February 29 through March 1, 1996 at the Cumberland
School of Law at Samford University.
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experience is not inherently benign, that is, but a force of
human nature capable of great good or evil.
What is true in this general way about public action is true
in specific and strong ways in the life of the lawyer, and it is
about this that I mainly wish to speak. The lawyer is perpetually claiming meaning, both for the events with which she deals
and for the law itself. In the former case, she faces the
intractable tension between the hard reality of human experience and the necessarily inadequate languages into which it is
her task to translate it, a challenge worthy of any mind. In the
latter case, when deciding what the law should mean, she must
put herself in the special position that the law offers those who
construe it, namely that of one who when he reads law, makes
law.
For reading a statute or opinion cannot be reduced to a
process of reading commands, as a political subordinate reads
the orders of his superior, since the meaning of the law is not
simply there, in the texts; rather, it must be construed by the
lawyers, in light of larger purposes and values. And the process
of construction is not a simple question of legislative will, as
though one could see through the words to such a thing, but
takes quite a different form: In the case of a statute, the
question is not "what the legislature intended," but "what this
statute should be taken to mean," given not only the words of
the statute and whatever legislative history exists, but the
whole fabric of prior law, including other legislation, the
common law background against which it was assumed to be
written, fundamental commitments of value in constitutional
documents and other texts construing them, and so forth. The
legal text in this way always calls upon its reader to integrate
its meaning with the other texts that make up the law; this
means that the smallest or most trivial case may present the
lawyer with the opportunity of speaking to the very largest
questions of public meaning and value.
If the heart of the life of civic responsibility and action is
the making of laws, as Dean Kronman suggests, the lawyer
engages in this activity all the time. Every time she construes
a piece of legislation, an opinion, a regulation, or a contract,
she is participating in the making of law, and this is equally
true when she argues a case, when she decides it as a judge,
or when she advises her client that the law permits or forbids
a certain course of conduct.
On the other hand, it is important to see that the work of
the lawyer in reading and making law cannot be reduced to
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mere policy judgments, for in the law no choice is wholly free
of constraint. Every actor must ask himself not only what he
thinks the best result (or the best policy) would be; he must
ask to whatjudgments authoritatively made by others he must
accord respect, and why. It is not simply the question, "How
should this case be decided?" that he must answer as judge,
then, or to which he must argue as lawyer, but-parallel to the
question he must ask in reading a statute-"How should this
case be decided, given this array of prior cases, legislation,
constitutional provisions, and the like?" each of which must be
read and construed.
In both the identification of texts and their construction,
then, the lawyer is engaged in the special kind of lawmaking
that respects certain judgments made by others. This means
that virtually all the intellectual and moral capacities and
virtues appropriate to law-making of this kind are called upon
in nearly every aspect of his daily life. One could hardly
imagine a richer life, or one more naturally public and civic
in its nature, than that offered by a profession in which one
constantly gives meaning not only to the immediate experience of others but to our shared past and present. In doing
this one in fact gives "meaning," in another sense of the term,
to one's own life.
II.

Yet when we ask our students how they imagine their
futures, or when we talk to our graduates about what they do,
we often hear a different story, marked by a note of discouragement or disappointment. One question is why. Part of the
answer, no doubt, lies in the commercialization of law practice, by which I mean a professional life in which attention is
focussed not on the meaning of what the lawyer is actually
doing, as a lawyer, so much as upon the market for his
services. This in turn reflects a larger reconception of the
nature of human life, especially our shared life, as an essentially economic activity, a process often described as one in which
self-interested actors rationally pursue their goals, seeking to
gratify whatever tastes or preferences they bring to the process.
Thus success for the nation is measured in terms of G.N.P.,
not human flourishing or human rights; the student in the
university is imagined as a customer, whose felt needs or
desires it is our task to gratify, rather than as a person who
needs an education; and medicine is conceived of as the
"delivery" of something called "health care services," rather
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than as a profession devoted to giving sick people proper
medical attention-all as though the meaning of what we do
can be reduced to a commodity transferred for money. Of
course there is an economic element in each of the situations
I describe above, and an economic analysis of them may be
fruitful; but there is also more than that, and that "more" is
crucial to the value and meaning of the activity in question.
We do ourselves a disservice when we allow one feature of our
experience, and one language, to dominate others; in particular we erode our capacity to meet the need that public life and
the professions partly exist to satisfy, the need to claim
adequate meaning for our shared existence.
In the law the process of deprofessionalization I describe
is also fed, I think, by the modem law school, when it focusses
so exclusively upon the law as a set of policy choices, themselves frequently cast in economic terms. What I have characterized as the central feature of the lawyer's life, the claiming
of meaning through the reading of authoritative texts, was
once the center of a legal education; but it is no longer; and
one consequence of the shift is that we are no longer training
our students to see and realize the possibilities for meaningful
action and life that are present at the center of the profession
they have chosen.
In fact, the lawyer's professional judgments cannot be
reduced to economic form or to economic analysis, and this
for two reasons: first, because economics has no way to respect
authority external to itself, which is the root of legal thought;
second, because law concerns itself in large part with what
economics takes for granted, namely, what economists call the
formation of "taste" or "preferences"-and what others call the
fundamental questions of individual and collective human life:
what we should value, who we should be. As a method of
analysis, economics assumes that those choices have been
made; it then pursues the question how they can be harmonized or otherwise interact to mutual benefit. But there are
questions prior to economics, questions of value and being,
that it cannot address, and these are central to every legal
argument.
I think, then, that the true nature and possibilities of legal
practice are to some extent obscured both by the dominant
economic conception of our shared life and by the dominant
focus in our law schools on law as policy, rather than on law
as the art of making choices that are at once partly con-
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strained and guided by an authoritative culture, partly open to
our present judgment.
* **

How, under these circumstances, is law as a profession
properly to be taught? Not without economics, or politics, or
psychology, or history, for all have much to contribute to legal
thought and debate; but not as any of these things. Rather, law
should be taught as a discipline of thought and argument with
its own structure, its own elements, at the center of which is
the activity of claiming meaning for human experience, at the
individual and collective level, and doing so in a language that
is at once a source of authority and itself subject to perpetual
revision. It can best be taught I think through a revived case
method; one in which the case is seen not, as apparently
Langdell thought, as a particular instance to be scientifically
subsumed under a general rule, but in an even more oldfashioned way: as a kind of prospective apprenticeship, in
which the student learns by doing. What the lawyer will face
in her professional life is a series of cases, after all; a legal
education can be conceived of as training her how to deal
with cases, which, if looked at clearly enough, almost invariably
have a quality of freshness or newness, testing the adequacy of
prior formulations and calling for present invention. They
involve her directly in the process described above, of claiming
meaning for experience in an authoritative language that is
made by others but open to transformation at her hands.
What she can learn is the kind of complex thought and
argument, at once general and particular, at once interpretive
and creative, at once respectful of the past and responsive to
the present, that characterizes the law at its best.
III.
Everything I have said is related to meaning in the second
sense in which I have used the term, the meaning of a
professional life. In this connection, I want to make the point
that the satisfactions I am describing are in principle available
throughout the profession, not merely in certain elite firms. In
fact, I think the life of the small city or small-town lawyer
offers remarkable possibilities along the lines both Dean
Kronman and I have suggested. Here, one can make a decent
living; maintain professional standards; live and work with
many of the same people, both as lawyers and as clients, over
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a lifetime; serve one's community in various explicit ways,
perhaps on a school board or zoning commission; have a place
in one's church or synagogue; have a real relation with one's
spouse and children; and in doing all of this, engage powerfully in the processes by which the community claims meaning
for its experience. A rich life of many dimensions, public and
private. Of course, this life is not for everyone, and some big
firms and big cities offer unique opportunities of other kinds;
but the life I describe does seem to me a good one.
If I am right, why do our students not line up for the kind
of life I describe above, especially when it seems to fit with
many of their own values? Part of it, I think, has to do with
their socialization: they have so far proceeded from prestigious
institution to prestigious institution, and this is the model on
which it is natural for them to take the next step. To do
anything else is for some of them literally unthinkable. Part of
it, too, is once more the fault of the law schools, for all too
often we encourage our students to imagine the practice of
law hierarchically, with certain big firms in certain big cities at
the top, smaller firms in smaller towns near the bottom. This
is most unfortunate, I think, because it leads our students
towards practices that may not fit with their own values, and
often without their considering the alternatives at all.
But there is also something larger, touched on by Dean
Kronman, namely the nature of experience in a mass media
age. People sometimes choose the big city because it has an
existence in what might be called "the news," and the big firm
for parallel reasons, because it has an existence in the professional news. If I go to Los Angeles or Chicago I am going to
a place everyone has heard of; of course they have not heard
of me, but that does not matter; I identify with the team I
have joined. I think it used to be different, and suspect that in
the South it still is. People used to think that where they came
from was real, and mattered, and was as full of the drama of
life as any other place, maybe fuller; that it too had wise
people and fools, saints and evil ones, and real possibilities for
life. People used to think, that is, that their own experience
was real and that it mattered. If there is an educational task we
should take seriously, it is helping our students conceive of
their own experience, and that of other individual human
beings, as real and important.
The dissipated sense of the reality of one's own experience
may be at work in the practice of law itself, and in a way that
is connected to the commercialization described above. It used
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to be quite common for the lawyer to think of himself as very
different from his clients; it was to his profession, as much as
to his clients, that his loyalties extended. Now lawyers all too
often imagine themselves as simply selling services in a world
in which the customer is king. Instead of feeling that they in
some ways elevate the experience of their clients, as they
translate it into the language of the law and claim for it a new
kind of meaning, they often feel that they reduce the law, and
what it could mean, to a system of manipulation. In doing so,
they lose much of what a profession means.
For a comparison, think of the transport of goods for sale:
what could be more plainly a business, merely commercial,
than that? Yet think also of what Joseph Conrad and others
have been able to make of the meaning of the life of the sea,
which was, from an economic point of view, simply the
transport of goods. This is in part a question of imagination:
how do you imagine yourself and what you are doing? It is
partly, too, a question of material and social limitation, for one
cannot make an art, or a profession, out of just anything.
Listen to what Conrad says in The Mirrorof the Sea:
I think I can lay my finger upon the difference between the
seamen of yesterday, who are still with us, and the seamen of
tomorrow, already entered upon the possession of their inheritance. History repeats itself, but the special call of an art which
has passed away is never reproduced. It is as utterly gone out of
the world as the song of a destroyed wild bird. Nothing will
awaken the same response of pleasurable emotion or conscientious endeavour. And the sailing of any vessel afloat is an art
whose fine form seems already receding from us on its way to the
overshadowed Valley of Oblivion. The taking of a modem
steamship about the world (though one would not minimize its
responsibilities) has not the same quality of intimacy with nature,
which, after all, is an indispensable condition to the building up
of an art. It is less personal and a more exact calling; less
arduous, but also less gratifying in the lack of close communion
between the artist and the medium of his art. It is, in short, less
a matter of love. Its effects are measured exactly in time and
space as no effect of an art can be. It is an occupation which a
man not desperately subject to sea-sickness can be imagined to
follow with content, without enthusiasm, with industry, without
affection. Punctuality is its watchword. The incertitude which
attends closely every artistic endeavour is absent from its
regulated enterprise. It has no great moments of self-confidence,
or moments not less great of doubt and heart-searching. It is an
industry which, like other industries, has its romance, its honour,
and its rewards, its bitter anxieties and its hours of ease. But such
sea-going has not the artistic quality of a single-handed struggle
with something much greater than yourself; it is not the labori-
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art whose ultimate result remains
not an individual, temperamental
skilled use of a captured force,
upon the way of universal con-

The law is transformative. It acts upon certain materialthe problem or dispute or trouble brought by the client to the
lawyer-which has one principle of organization and intelligibility, and converts it into something that has to be understood in very different ways. In a case like Cohen v. California,'
for example, it converts a dispute about a vulgar motto on a
jacket into a consideration of the fundamental nature of
political speech in our society. In converting its material, the
law converts us as well, both speakers and listeners, as we
come to inhabit the world this language and culture define.
Conversion of this kind is a radical form of human activity, for
which our word is art: we convert earth and oil into paintings
that may change the imagination; pleasing sounds into music,
not always pleasing, but sometimes of incredible power and
beauty; human actors and costumes and words into another
dimension of reality, on the stage, with another claim on our
attention altogether. So too, in the law: we convert immediate
experience into the subject of thought of a particular kind,
which has at its center the question of meaning: what this
event means, and should mean, in the language of the law;
and what that language itself means, as a way in which we
articulate our deepest values and attain collective being. The
life that gives meaning in such a way is itself a life of meaning.
There are deep traditions that conceive of law in such
ways, and we should do our best to keep them alive. I am
reminded, for example, of Solomon: when he became King,
the Lord appeared to him in a dream and said: "Ask what I
shall give thee." Solomon replied: "Give unto thy servant an
understanding heart to judge thy people, that I may discern
between good and bad."4 He did not ask for money, or long
life, or the death of his enemies, but for a wise and understanding heart; or, as Dante put it when he retold the story in

'JOSEPH CONRAD, THE MIRROR OF THE SEA 30-33 (J.M. Dent, 1946 ed.).
403 U.S. 15 (1971).

*I Kings 3:5-9 (King James).
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the Paradiso,he asked not to know how many spheres there
were in heaven, or whether necessity conditioned by contingency is true necessity, or whether one can make a triangle in
a semicircle that does not have a right angle, but, anticipating
one of Dean Kronman's favorite words, he asked for royal
prudence, regal prudenza.5
It is important to see that this is a quality of the individual
mind, of individual experience. "Whenever you are uncertain,"
Dante says, "put lead on your feet, to make you slow to reach
either Yes or No: for a quick judgment often takes the wrong
way; and then the feelings bind the intellect"-that is, your
capacity for thought is impaired by your emotional commitment to the decision you have hastily made.'
For a lawyer, this is very good advice indeed. And one can
see what its premise is: that excellence ofjudgment is the work
of the whole mind, including the affections, including the
capacity to suspend conclusion. This in turn means that
excellence of this kind is to be attained only by the development of the individual mind; not by a mass education, or by
the experience of groups or classes, but through sustained
attention to individual experience of intellectual and affective
life. In the development of such capacities-which lie at the
heart of the profession of the law-there is ground for hope
that some of the tendencies of our world identified by Dean
Kronman can be resisted. For "I have often seen," wrote
Dante, "a thorn bush stand fierce and rigid all winter long," as
if it were 7stark and lifeless; "then, in the spring, bear a rose at
its crest."

5 THE DINE COMEDY OF DANTE AIGHIERI, III, PARADISO 191-95 (John D. Sinclair
trans., 1948).
6 Id at 195.
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